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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Katherine Faye Perry 
 
Master of Science 
 
Department of Geography 
 
June 2019 
 
Title: Voter Migration & Electoral Trends in North Carolina, 2000−2016 
 
 
Because American electoral procedures are inherently spatial in nature, the 
distribution of voters across space occupies a central role as electoral politics play out 
across various scales (Gimpel and Hui 2015). This study explores voter migration at the 
county-level as a force for shaping the evolution of party support in North Carolina over 
the last 15 years, and draws on economic geography and labor economics in the United 
States, the effect of group psychology, and literature on the role of partisanship in voter 
migration. Using migration data published by the U.S. Census Bureau, I find that the nature 
of migration diverges significantly between those with a college degree and those without. 
Using an experimental method based on partisanship, I estimate the degree of partisan 
change across North Carolina's counties. The calculations line up with changes on the 
ground, though imperfectly and with the natural limitations of data-driven research. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 There is no shortage of reports showcasing the economic and population losses of 
rural America. Just months before Donald J. Trump was elected president, The Atlantic 
published yet another story recounting a familiar tale of a rural American-West city 
struggling to retain its youth, opportunities, and economic vigor (Semuels 2016), and the 
trend is not specific to any one region. Rethink Mississippi, an online publication oﬀering 
critical analysis of issues facing 
today’s Mississippi, lamented 
the insistent outmigration from 
the state: “New Census data, 
same old story: People keep 
leaving Mississippi” (McGraw 
2017). American Appalachia 
faces a similar challenge, as the 
region’s natives, and especially 
those with college and 
advanced degrees, continue to 
seek opportunities elsewhere (Kahn 2009). The proliferation of such stories validates 
recent findings from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (see Figure 1), which noted that 
rural America experienced its first year of absolute population decline in 2012 with a very 
distinct geography (see Map 1), a trend that endured for six years before small population 
increases brought it to a close (2018).  
 This exodus of people from rural America (which is itself a diverse group, see e.g. 
Scala, Johnson, and Rogers 2015) seeking opportunities elsewhere, a trend often referred 
to as ‘brain drain,’ is usually treated primarily as an economic issue, and indeed, economic 
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Figure 1. Produced by author based on USDA 
(2018b). 
motivations are the primary factor pushing people away from rural towns and into larger 
cities (see e.g. Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo 1992; Greenwood 1975; Greenwood, Hunt, and 
McDowell 1986). The emphasis on the economic consequences of such movement, 
however, obscures its impact on the spatial distribution of voters across the United States, 
a consequence deserving of additional investigation. Inherent to patterns of interstate 
migration is the political consequence that as people move, they carry their votes with 
them.  
The movement of people plays a significant role in the American electoral process, 
but to leave that assumption without further consideration does not do justice to the 
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Map 1. Produced by author based on U.S. Census Bureau (2019). 
potential impact interstate migration has on electoral outcomes. The movement of voters 
across space is not random, as evidenced by the trends reported by USDA and popular 
media outlets: the net movement of people in the United States over the last 15 years 
drains rural areas of their communities and supplies metropolitan areas with higher 
populations. Moreover, the movement of people in the United States appears to be 
shaped greatly by education and income (see Dougherty, et al. 2018, Florida 2012, Florida 
2018). The socioeconomic forces behind interstate migration flows in the United States 
cannot be separated from the political consequences, as characteristics such as race, 
gender, income, and education are often tied to political partisanship (see Gimpel 1999, 
Pew Research Center 2015, Pew Research Center 2018), and consequently have the 
potential to shape the geography of party victories.  
Indeed, the presence of a political rural/urban divide in the United States and its 
significance for the American political landscape is rarely contested among scholars and 
writers across the political spectrum and academic disciplines (consider Scala and 
Johnson 2017, Vance 2018, Hochschild 2016). A New York Times op-ed features a 
comment from Stanford political scientist Jonathan Rodden that, “as you go from the 
center of cities out through the suburbs and into rural areas, you traverse in a linear 
fashion from Democratic to Republican places” (Wilkinson 2018), while Wall Street 
Journal reporter Janet Hook notes “deep splits [in the American electorate] along 
geographic and educational lines” (Hook 2017). If the movement of people (i.e. voters) 
across the United States isn’t random, then perhaps there is a discernible pattern of 
movement which then can be studied to identify how flows of people influence the 
outcomes of elections, even experimentally. As Enos notes at the close of his work The 
Space Between Us, “the complete freedom to move — highly valued in free societies — is 
the freedom to segregate” (2017, 225). Such an idea occupies a central place in this 
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project: how do the increasingly homogenous political units relate to patterns of 
migration? Using North Carolina as a case study, is there evidence of partisan self-sorting 
when we consider the electoral evolution of the state as well as migration patterns?  
North Carolina makes for an interesting subject for two primary reasons: its 
political heterogeneity and its economic geography. North Carolina remains a swing state, 
with strong Democratic voting blocs in its urban centers and reliable Republican voters in 
its rural areas. Additionally, North Carolina attracts migrants from within the state as well 
as outside the state to areas like Charlotte, Asheville, and the Research Triangle, which 
boast significant opportunity and robust labor markets especially for the college-educated. 
Outside of those areas, however, markets struggle to attract new talent in a way urban 
areas do not, creating dynamic flows of internal migration.  
In order to untangle any potential relationship that exists between interstate 
migration in the United States and the geography of the American political landscape, I 
opted to use an extensive, data-driven approach and to integrate three largely disparate 
bodies of literature: the geography of the emerging (or emergent) information economy, 
the impact of identity and neighborhood eﬀects on political aﬃliation, and work that 
focuses on voter migration explicitly. Addressing elements of all three types of research 
provides the appropriate framework and vocabulary to parse out if and how 
socioeconomics interacts with partisanship and migration to shape the American electoral 
landscape. The following paper is broken into three sections: one focusing on the 
literature, a second exploring and breaking down the data in order to build an 
understanding of movement in North Carolina as it relates to voter migration, and finally, 
one reflecting on key takeaways, lessons learned, and future directions for research on 
voter migration.  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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
 The American political system is inherently spatial: U.S. presidents are elected 
with votes collected at the state-level, our representatives at the district-level, our city 
councilors at the municipal level. The process of holding elections too is tied to space. 
Where we live determines where we go to cast our votes, how much representation we 
have, what kind of identification we need at the polling station, who is on our ballot — 
the list goes on. Moreover, while coverage of American elections now almost invariably 
includes a map and some appreciation for the central role space occupies in our elections, 
we take for granted that the lines that divide states, districts, and counties do not in fact 
divide immobile populations nor do they create meaningful containers for political life 
(see John Agnew 1996). Perhaps it seems obvious to point out that on the contrary, the 
results of elections hinge on the voters that occupy each of these political units, and the 
character of the voting population changes constantly as policy, demography, economics, 
and other variables determine who votes for whom and where over time.   
 Given the nature of American elections, the issue of voter migration is a 
geographic problem: who moves where, and why? What is the political-spatial impact of 
certain flows of internal migrants? The relationship between voter migration and the 
American political landscape remains largely (though not entirely) uninvestigated by 
geographers, leaving the topic primarily to political scientists. However, one must go far 
beyond political science literature to meaningfully address voter migration. We must 
consider the information economy, urban-economic geography, political identity, and 
group psychology in order to build the framework necessary to tackle such a complex 
problem. The following section is divided into three parts: a review of relevant literature 
diving into the changing economic geography of the United States and how it relates to 
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migration, the eﬀects of gathering like-minded people into the same cities, and a brief 
overview of some arguments against voter sorting.  
The evolving geography of economic opportunity and electoral politics  
The economics behind the ‘where’ and ‘why’ of interstate migration in the United States  
 Before diving into the political consequences of internal migration (i.e. the 
movement of people within the United States), we need to understand where people 
move and why.  The people who move within the United States are not a random or 
representative segment of the American population. Rather, as Gimpel and Schuknecht 
note, “because of the costs associated with migration, there is likely to be an economic 
bias in who moves and who does not,” where “internal migrants (as opposed to 
immigrants) are most likely to be better educated, young, white, and upwardly 
mobile” (2009, 28). Because such characteristics are not separable from political aﬃliation 
and tend to have a relationship with partisan voting patterns (Gimpel and Schuknecht 
2009, 35), the migration of people in the United States will in some way shape the 
political landscape, given that votes are collected based on spatially defined units.  
Answering the why of internal migration requires sacrificing some nuance and 
reducing what is often a multi-scalar and complex choice to a series of variables, but 
relevant literature has shown that people in the United States move primarily for 
economic reasons (see e.g. Gimpel and Hui 2015; Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo 1992; 
Greenwood 1975; Greenwood, Hunt, and McDowell 1986). To explore the ‘why’ in more 
detail is an important subject of academic research, but not the focus of this paper. Of 
greatest importance here is the idea that the decisions of households and individuals to 
move to a diﬀerent county or state are largely motivated and shaped by economic 
opportunity. The ‘where,’ then, matters significantly and is more easily answered by 
 6
considering broadly the economic 
geography of the United States. 
Data from the U.S. Census that 
documents county-level movement 
(a dataset that will be considered in 
depth in Chapter 2) provides 
insight into this matter. Thus, 
central to any work on interstate 
migration in the United States is 
consideration of the evolving 
economic geography of the country 
as well as the incentives that direct 
movement between counties and 
states over time. 
The economic landscape in the 
United States is highly varied 
across space in terms of industry, 
wages, and the strength of labor 
markets, making it a geography 
worth studying. Perhaps more importantly, the information economy has wreaked havoc 
on the longstanding economic system of the United States, undoing historic geographies 
of manufacturing and heavy industry and transferring capital (and economic might) to 
tech-heavy metropolitan areas (Florida 2012, Moretti 2012). Figure 2 highlights the 
shifting geography of American GDP among metropolitan areas, where Midwestern 
cities like Detroit, Cleveland, and Milwaukee that once powered the United States 
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Figure 2. Produced by author based on Weissman 
2012.
economy have been displaced by coastal metropolitan regions like Washington, D.C., 
Portland, and the Bay Area.   
 A helpful conceptual starting point to explore interstate migration and the 
aforementioned economic trend is Richard Florida’s idea of the “creative class” (Florida 
2003). A category of people whose jobs depend on the deployment of creativity, the 
creative class includes professions from engineering and software development to design 
and art. It is most useful to consider his hypothesis vis-à-vis the migration of the creative 
class (a group of almost necessarily college-educated people). He asserts that members of 
the creative class are flocking to a handful of cities in the United States, which comprise 
only 10 percent of the state’s metropolitan regions. “In other words,” he points out, “90 
percent of all metropolitan regions in the United States are net exporters of talent—they 
lose their creative young people” (27).  
 Research pointing to similar conclusions abounds. Moretti reported a clustering 
eﬀect in major cities, which served to attract highly skilled and educated workers and 
intensify the growing divide between wealthy metropolitan areas and the micropolitan 
and non-metro, non-core counties suﬀering from population loss (2012). In a study 
published in 2012, Florida et al. found that the most highly skilled workers in the United 
States are likely to move to metro[politan] areas (the authors note, however, that “whether 
regional wages draw skilled individuals to a region, thereby increasing wages or whether 
highly skilled individuals drive regional wages is uncertain, but the relationship between 
skills and wages is clear and unambiguous” (371)). Intimately connected is the conclusion 
of a 2014 study noting that displacement of workers between two metropolitan areas of 
relatively equal economic capacities is unlikely — instead, displacement tends to be away 
from economically struggling regions to those with greater economic opportunity 
(Moretti and Wilson). Indeed, the growing economic inequality between these magnet 
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metropolitan regions and the rural and micropolitan areas left behind (see Map 2) drove 
Florida to publish again in 2017, walking back some key components of his earlier 
writing and focusing instead on the idea of “winner-take-all urbanism,” where wealth 
breeds additional wealth, draining less prosperous cities of talent and skilled workers 
(Florida 2017).  
 Such trends speak to an increasing mobile population largely comprised of young, 
college-educated, white, wealthy college graduates with the skills to access high-paying 
jobs settling in metropolitan areas from Washington, D.C. to Denver, CO (see 
Dougherty, et al. 2018, Gimpel 1999). Indeed, Tables 1 and 2 show the ten cities with the 
highest shares of ‘creative class’ members (Florida 2015) and college-educated millennials 
(Brookings Institute 2018) respectively — seven of the ten overlap. The intention here is 
not to suggest that these groups are identical; they are most surely not. The important 
trend to note is the perhaps unsurprising association between young, college-educated 
people and a prevalence of employment related to the knowledge economy.  
 In an article following the publication of the Brookings Institute study 
documenting the geography of college-educated millennials, Florida and Mellander 
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Map 2. Share of digital and technology jobs by county. Map by New York Times (Porter 
2018). 
found that the same group are likely to be found in cities where a substantial segment of 
the population is “employed in knowledge, professional, and creative occupations” (Florida 
2018). Dougherty et al. found a similar pattern, though more explicitly related to 
movement, when they noted that college graduates by and large move to burgeoning 
metropolitan areas in order to maximize their professional prospects, and by extension, 
contribute to the widening gap between the metropolitan and the rural and micropolitan. 
Though these trends widely identified cannot be universally applied to all college 
graduates, the extent to which they hold true suggest that they are worth studying.  
The knowledge economy, electoral politics, & the role of education 
The pattern of movement away from cities and towns facing economic insecurity 
resulting from the restructuring of the American economy around tech, professional, and 
City Share of 
‘creative class’
City Percent of millennials 
with college degree
San Jose, CA 46.1% Boston, MA 58%
Washington, D.C. 44.6% Madison, WI 58%
Boston, MA 38.8% San Jose, CA 55%
San Francisco, CA 37.5% San Francisco, CA 55%
Hartford, CT 37.0% Washington, D.C. 54%
Seattle, WA 35.7% Hartford, CT 50%
Baltimore, MD 34.8% New York, NY 47%
Denver, CO 34.3% Raleigh, NC 47%
Minneapolis-St. Paul, 
MN
34.1% Minneapolis-St. 
Paul, MN
47%
Austin, TX 34.1% Denver, CO 46%
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Table 1. Cities with the highest shares of 
‘creative class’ members (Florida 2015). 
Table 2. Cities with the greatest shares of 
millennials with college degrees 
(Brookings Institute 2018).
high-skill industry would not be important to political geography if, as suggested earlier, 
political regions were perfectly heterogenous across counties and states, and if the people 
moving were a representative segment of the American population. Because neither is 
true, the political ramifications of interstate migration deserve more in-depth 
investigation. It is increasingly clear that the individuals and households with the greatest 
facility to move are college-educated, white, and wealthy or upwardly mobile. Up until the 
turn of the century, such descriptors would point toward a conservative (and consequently 
Republican) base of interstate migrants in the United States (see e.g. Gimpel and 
Schuknecht 2009, Judis and Teixeira 2002) shifting votes among states and counties. 
Over the last quarter of a century, however, fundamental shifts have changed the way 
some of those characteristics are related to partisanship and point instead toward a 
Democratic voting bloc concentrating in urban centers. These very patterns allow for the 
type of experimental data-driven methods found in this study.  
In their discussion of the relationship between demography and political 
partisanship, Judis and Teixeira note the connection between the economic shift towards 
tech and the increasingly liberal preferences of the workers pushing that change. They 
write that, “Democrats are strongest in areas where the production of ideas and services 
has either redefined or replaced assembly-line manufacturing, particularly in the North 
and West […] while Republicans are strongest in states […] where the transition to 
postindustrial society has lagged” (71). They situate their theory around the idea of an 
“ideopolis,” which is defined broadly as metropolitan areas (the apparent new currency of 
the postindustrial economy) with high concentrations of people involved in the 
production of “soft technology — entertainment, media, fashion, design, and 
advertising” (72). Using language strikingly similar to that employed by Florida to 
describe the creative class, they take his argument a step further by connecting the shift to 
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electoral politics, writing that, “if you compare 1980, the beginning of the Reagan era, to 
today, it is clear that almost all of the pro-Democratic change in the country since then 
has been concentrated in America’s ideopolis counties” (76).  
 Here it is worth noting that individual partisanship is informed by a host of 
factors and obviously cannot be boiled down to any single demographic characteristic, job, 
or element of a voter’s life. Determining how an individual voter participates in the 
electoral process and which candidate a given voter will choose is an imperfect art at best 
— one that is complicated by a series of unpredictable variables, from deeply held values 
to income and education. These and other moving parts have a role to play in 
understanding partisan preferences as well as predicting partisan activity. Still, 
relationships exist between political aﬃliation and race, income, educational attainment, 
and other demographic characteristics ( Jurjevich and Plane 2012). Even if demographic 
data cannot paint a full picture of how people cast votes in the United States, they still 
oﬀer a helpful lens to understand past and present trends in order to create a more robust 
sense of American electoral politics. 
 As we saw in the comparison between metropolitan areas with high 
concentrations of the creative class and those with college degrees, access to higher 
education is a near prerequisite (if not a universal prerequisite) to participate in a 
knowledge- and information-driven economy. A college degree is deeply embedded in the 
current structure of the American economy, allowing for greater access to the high-skill 
(and generally higher profit) labor that drives markets in the United States. Educational 
attainment also serves as a helpful demographic characteristic to explore partisanship, and 
as a result, is of great interest for this study.   
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 The positive correlation between a college education and liberal political 
preferences is increasingly relevant (see Figure 3) and widely noted across the United 
States, though with variation by state, region, and county (which signals of the 
importance of context when considering the eﬀect of various demographic characteristics 
on political aﬃliation (see e.g. Gimpel and Schuknecht 2009, Holbrook 2016). In North 
Carolina, the relationship between education and political partisanship largely fits what 
has been shown across the United States — the higher the level of education, the more 
likely it is that a voter will lean to the left politically (Pew Research Center 2014) (see 
Figure 3 for a breakdown of each educational group). That relationship has been widely 
studied and confirmed (see e.g. Robinson and Noriega 2010, Holbrook 2016, Bishop 
2008, Judis and Teixeira 2002). I draw on that relationship using an experimental method 
to investigate how education (and anticipated partisanship) connects with patterns of 
migration in North Carolina.  
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Figure 3. Produced by author based on Pew Research Center 2016. 
Group identity, interstate migration, and voter migration 
 It’s useful to consider again to Enos’ assertion that “the complete freedom to move 
— highly valued in free societies — is the freedom to segregate” (225). The geography of 
economic opportunity, as it is shaped by tech and professional industries, clearly plays a 
leading role in shaping patterns of migration of college-educated, mobile people in the 
United States and in North Carolina. Deciding where to live, however, is not strictly a 
question of dollars and cents. Similarly, voter sorting is not simply the result of like-
minded people gathering in cities with the most economic opportunity. Rather, the 
geography of professional and knowledge-based jobs interacts with what we know about 
group psychology — the human desire to live amongst those who are similar to us (in 
other words, to segregate) and the positive feedback loop that pushes like-minded groups 
even further towards consensus. Both the idea of self-selecting communities as well as the 
eﬀects of such a trend to further homogenize groups have a particular place in the 
discussion of spatial-political polarization.  
 Parsing out how individuals and households make decisions about where to live 
(explicitly and implicitly) and identifying the eﬀects of like-minded communities occupy 
is not the focus of this project. Nevertheless, not to consider the role of identity and group 
psychology in political communities would leave out a significant piece of the puzzle. 
Fortunately, scholars across disciplines have undertaken substantial research on political 
identity (Mason 2015, Mason 2016), the small-scale sorting of people (Hui 2013), and 
the impact that has on voting ( Jurjevich and Plane 2012). Integrating their findings helps 
support the theoretical framework within which I situate the data set forth in this study. 
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Self-selecting communities, political identity, and the feedback loop 
 At a time when people are increasingly likely not only to share neighborhoods and 
school districts with people of similar political stripes, but also more likely to marry them 
(Iyengar, Konitzer and Tedin 2018), partisan sorting at a minimum seems likely to play 
some role in shaping the American political landscape. As Gimpel and Hui eloquently 
assert, “even if a small fraction of partisans make choices on a political basis, the 
cumulative eﬀect in the long run can greatly augment population diﬀerences across space” 
(2015, 139).  
The question of politically motivated migration has yet to be definitively answered 
(largely a result of a lack of appropriate data, see Jurjevich and Plane 2012), though 
numerous scholars have tackled the question and called for additional investigation. In 
their attempt to answer whether communities sort themselves politically, Gimpel and Hui 
survey movers about their motivations and priorities, ultimately arriving at the conclusion 
that economic motivations serve as the principal variable shaping migration. They 
highlight, however, that “people possess a fundamental need to feel valued, sentiments 
that are undermined if they regularly confront moral and political rejection” (2015, 132). 
Though economic motivations might determine a selection of potential destinations, 
finding a community with shared values might push a migrant to choose one location 
over another, acting as a sort of “tie-breaker” among options that are equally possible 
(2015, 139). Meanwhile, Hui found that though partisanship didn’t figure prominently in 
the moving equation, partisanship of neighbors did aﬀect respondents’ satisfaction with 
their neighborhoods (2013). She found that those surveyed demonstrated greater 
satisfaction when people find out that they live among more co-partisans than they had 
guessed, and less satisfaction if there were fewer co-partisans than they expected. Other 
research points to the same conclusion: there is at least enough evidence to prop up the 
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possibility that partisanship places some role in migration, and that it could dramatically 
alter the electoral geography of the United States (Cho, Gimpel and Hui 2013).  
The psychology of belonging and a sense of identity seem to shape decision-
making about where migrants move. Indeed, outside of the migration context, 
partisanship is widely considered to be increasingly salient in that process of identity-
making (see Taub 2017, Mason 2015, Mason 2016, Enos 2017). Though Enos approaches 
partisanship as a function of race and class, he asserts that “partisanship is a social 
identity” (2017, 163). Mason too, drawing on work from Roccas and Brewer, explores the 
idea of partisanship as an identity in the context of compounding identities (Taub 2017), 
whereby the multiple identities a person possesses (e.g. race, religion, income) align more 
neatly, and perceived diﬀerences between groups increase as a result. She too explicitly 
draws a connection to partisanship, writing that as that process of identity alignment 
continues to create well-sorted partisans, fewer and fewer voters will identify with 
multiple perspectives, ultimately pushing them away from moderation (2016, 1). In eﬀect, 
she argues that the process of alignment has served to boost party identification and 
political polarization (Mason 2015). If partisanship does indeed contribute to our sense of 
identities, it could push or pull us based on a desire to live among people who are like us, 
even if that motivation is not explicit.  
 Nonetheless, not all partisanship should be treated equally in studies of the 
relationship between politics and migration. Much of the recent research on voter 
migration finds that Republicans are likely to comprise most of the migrant population, a 
result drawn from the observation that most movement has taken place among white, 
wealthy, and well-educated communities (see e.g. Gimpel and Schuknecht 2009; Gimpel 
1999, Cho, Gimpel, and Hui 2013). Holbrook, however, found that most migrants tend 
to come from either ‘purple’ or ‘blue’ states, but writes that, “if a state draws its internal 
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migrants primarily from conservative or liberal states, then internal migration is likely to 
play a role in changing state political outcomes” (2016, 66).  
 Jurjevich and Plane too push back against the long-standing assumption that most 
migrants are Republicans (2012, 431), arguing instead that the community of internal 
migrants is “often more plural and considerably more diverse” than previously believed (442, 
emphasis in original). Work here suggests that much of the mobile population comes 
from counties that have moved away from the Republican Party from 2000 to 2016 and 
that many of them remained in counties that became less Republican (although that 
trend is less apparent when only considering 2016 results; just under half of all internal 
migrants left counties won by Democrats in 2016).  
 Partisan sorting, however, is not simply about like-minded people electing to live 
in the same places because of the positive feedback loop associated with such a trend. As 
Bishop notes, “mixed company moderates,” and “like-minded company polarizes” (2009, 
68). Indeed, there is substantial evidence to suggest that as people settle in more 
homogeneous communities, social eﬃciency increases (Enos 2017, 194) but so do 
extreme views “as a way to conform” (Bishop 2009, 69). Indeed, voter turnout is higher in 
communities with higher political homogeneity (Bishop 2009). Though the idea is 
counterintuitive if we assume that underrepresented communities have more at stake if 
they don’t participate, social pressure pushes people in significant political majorities to 
the polls because “a vote becomes more an aﬃrmation of the group than an expression of 
civic opinion” (Bishop 2009, 73).  
 Importantly, where you live (and the community that exists there) interacts with 
individual preferences and decision-making to produce a diﬀerent kind of geography, one 
where space and people interact to draw communities into greater homogeneity. Enos 
argues that “segregation itself aﬀects group-based bias” (2017, 133). Taken with Mason’s 
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research finding that political identities are increasingly intransigent, we can consider the 
possibility that living in a landslide county is likely to allow less space for competing 
perspectives. Crucially, we must integrate one of Enos’ key findings: “Space itself shapes 
our behavior” (2017, 232). 
Arguments against voter migration 
Bill Bishop, in his aptly named book The Big Sort, brought the idea of political 
sorting into the mainstream with his study of how lifestyle preferences, and by extension, 
politics, shape people’s decisions about where to live. Though Bishop was not the first to 
bring the question to light, the popularity of the publication attracted significant 
attention to the issue and led to a number of articles investigating Bishop’s findings. 
Unsurprisingly, the idea of voter sorting and the degree to which it matters has 
been debated with detractors and supporters across disciplines, with the definition of a 
landslide county figuring significantly into the dialogue. Indeed, Bishop bases his 
argument largely on the increase of landslide counties, which he defines as a county where 
a presidential election produced a margin greater than 20 points between 1976 and 2004. 
Strickler makes the case that the “big sort” is overblown.  Using Bishop’s own definition 
of landslide counties, Strickler finds little evidence to support the idea of extreme 
geographic political polarization. He concedes that the trend amounts to something, but 
not to the degree that Bishop asserts (a relatively common conclusion among those who 
find the polarization debate to be overdone, see Bialik 2013, Holbrook 2016, Chapman 
2018). Taking a wholly ageographic approach, Abrams and Fiorina make the case that 
technology negates the importance of geography and argue that “a neighborhood big sort 
could occur without changing either the everyday lives of most Americans or the political 
process that prevails today” (2012, 208). Where you live has implications for the character 
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of American politics, and ignoring the inherently spatiality of our political system 
weakens their argument substantially. 
 Though there is certainly room for discussion about the severity of spatial-political 
polarization in the United States, using the right metric to measure polarization is a 
crucial first step. Even Bill Bishop’s definition doesn’t capture the full range of 
possibilities. Rather than using the 20-point threshold employed by Bishop and Strickler, 
defining a landslide county as a county with a margin greater than 40 points, as I’ve done 
in this stud,y isolates more intensely homogenized political communities. Additionally, 
Abrams and Fiorina lean heavily on voter registration margins rather than electoral 
margins, which is also problematic. A substantial segment of voters do not register with a 
party (19 states do not allow for party registration with voter registration) and despite 
clear state-wide leanings, only five states demonstrate party majorities in their voter 
registration statistics, as independent registration among the other 31 states is roughly 
31% (Cook 2018).  
Summary 
 As Holbrook stated, “If we assume that in any given election year state-level 
outcomes are driven by the types of people who live in states and how their characteristics 
translate into political preferences (with some allowance for short-term influences to push 
the marker slightly in one direction or another), then explaining change in outcomes over 
time must incorporate measure of changes in the underlying population characteristics, as 
well as how those characteristics influence the vote” (2016, 36).  
 The central takeaway as we tackle the issue of migration and an evolving electoral 
landscape rests largely on the transformation of the American economy into an 
information- and knowledge-focused system. As the economic geography of the United 
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States changed to reflect this new system, so did the distribution of people as they sorted 
themselves to fill the growing demand for high-skill labor. As the literature reveals, the 
people who have flocked to the tech centers in the United States tend to be well-
educated, upwardly mobile, and white, and also display a set of political preferences that 
favor the Democratic party. The literature on group identity and the eﬀect of like-minded 
groups adds another layer to the question, and sheds light on the psychological eﬀects 
that follow the clustering of people with similar partisan leanings. These trends lay the 
groundwork for the American political landscape to be shaped greatly by internal 
migrants in North Carolina and beyond. 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III. DATA ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
 Central to this project is an exploration of county-level migration in North 
Carolina to assess whether it is possible to detect the trends that feature prominently in 
public discourse (i.e. a polarized political America) in the data itself. An extensive data 
approach lends itself well to the pursuit of a coarse sense of widespread migration 
patterns over recent years, and the appropriate datasets come in several forms: 1) two 
county-to-county level migration datasets produced by the U.S. Census Bureau in five-
year increments from 2006-2010 and from 2011-2015, which identify the origin and 
destination counties of nearly 700,000 migrants in total over the ten-year period, 2) a 
single county-to-county level migration dataset that contains the educational attainment 
of over 140,000 movers between 2007 and 2011, 3) electoral results from twelve statewide 
elections between 2000 and 2016 (comprised of five presidential, two gubernatorial, and 
five senatorial elections, all of which are won based on the county-level result), and 4) 
data collected by Pew Research Center which provides approximate breakdowns of 
partisanship based on educational attainment (2014).  
The aim of the project is not to predict electoral outcomes, to provide exact 
estimates of how many Democrats left a particular county, or to oﬀer any sort of 
inscrutable proof that migration shapes elections. Rather, the intent is to consider if and 
how migration (and a quantitative study of it) might fit into the complex equation that 
produces electoral outcomes in the United States. With that said, it is important to 
acknowledge the weaknesses of an extensive, data-driven approach. Single numbers do 
not allow for the nuance that interviews and qualitative research can provide. The 
structure of the dataset itself leaves room for substantial error. Margin of error in datasets 
like the county-to-county migration records sometimes exceeds the values themselves. 
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Additionally, five-year increments leave room for migrants who move multiple times 
within that time frame and, indeed, the dataset is incomplete. Not every record has an 
origin and destination county, which means that any analysis necessarily excludes some 
movement in the state. Other quantitative studies wrestle with the same data limitations 
(see e.g. Jurjevich and Plane 2012, Holbrook 2016, Hui 2013); even so, it is the best data 
available and, when situated properly, has potential to add another dimension to current 
work in electoral geography and to open the door to future studies. 
Data setup 
Approach to visualizing 
 Mapping and visualizing flows between North Carolina’s 100 individual counties 
muddles meaningful trends, as counties are not on their own meaningful containers for 
communities, economies, or political life. Instead, it makes more sense to group them 
based on various characteristics and then to map flows between those groups. In order to 
get multiple perspectives on the nature of migration within the state, I separated counties 
based on five diﬀerent sets of criteria (2 based on outside sources, 3 based on electoral 
results): prosperity zones, based on designations made by North Carolina’s own 
Department of Commerce; statistical designation by the U.S. Census Bureau (i.e. 
metropolitan statistical area, micropolitan statistical area, or non-metro, non-core); an 
electoral grouping based on aggregate electoral results from 2000 to 2016; an electoral 
grouping based on the 2016 presidential election; and an electoral grouping based on the 
change of the Republican share of votes between the 2000 and 2016 presidential 
elections. 
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Processing & notes 
 All of the datasets were processed using R and the parsetR package (Bostock, 
Davis, and Russell). I only included records where the origin and destination counties are 
in North Carolina (i.e. migration that took place within the state). Additionally, I 
excluded records in the U.S. Census Bureau datasets where either a destination county or 
origin county was missing so that the analysis only considers complete records. 
Brief explanation of the categories 
Prosperity zones.  The North Carolina Department of Commerce identifies economic 
regions in the state and groups them into seven groups.  
U.S. Census Bureau designation.  The U.S. Census Bureau designates counties based on 
the population size of the urban area. A metropolitan area has an urban population of at 
least 50,000, a micropolitan area has an urban population of at least 10,000 but under 
50,000, and non-metro, non-core counties have urban populations of 10,000 or below. 
Median electoral margin.  I calculated the median Democratic and Republican margins 
over the course of 12 senatorial, gubernatorial, and presidential election between 2000 to 
2016 and grouped them into six categories based on the degree of change. See Table 3 for 
an explanation of the categorizations.  
Table 3. County categorizations based on median electoral margin.  
Democratic margin Category Republican margin Category
0-20 points ldem 0-20 points lgop
20.01-40 points mdem 20.01-40 points mgop
40+ points hdem 40+ points hgop
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2016 Presidential electoral value.  Using the same rules of categorization that I used for 
the aggregate value, I assigned “lgop,” “ldem,” “mgop,” “mdem,” “hgop,” and “hdem” to 
each county based on the electoral margin during 2016 presidential election.  
Republican change electoral value.  To identify the Republican shift at the county level, I 
subtracted the 2000 presidential election Republican share from the 2016 presidential 
election Republican share to find the Republican diﬀerence (see Table 4 for examples). 
Counties that shifted up to 5 points towards the Republican party fall in the “low gain” 
counties with shifts toward the GOP greater than 5 points and up to 10 points fall into 
the “medium gain” category, and those with shifts between 10 points and 15 points fall 
into the “high gain” category. Counties that moved against Republican candidates 
between the 2000 and 2016 presidential elections have the same numeric divisions, and 
are called “losses.” See Table 5 for the categories and criteria. 
 The justification for using Republican change rather than Democratic change lies 
with the evolution of landslide counties in North Carolina between 2000 and 2016. 
Though a few counties have grown bluer (i.e. more Democratic) with time, the number of 
counties leaning more towards Republican candidates far outnumbers those where 
Democrats have made gains (see Electoral Evolution section). Naturally, population is not 
evenly distributed in the state of North Carolina, so those counties do not necessarily 
represent a growing substantial majority of voters, but instead demonstrate a striking 
spatial trend developing over time. With that in mind, I chose to use Republican electoral 
change to break up counties. 
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Table 4. Snippet of elections table showing Republican and Democratic diﬀerences.   
Table 5. Rules for categorization based on the Republican change variable. 
Electoral evolution in North Carolina 
 By all accounts, the United States is dealing with an increasingly vitriolic, 
polarized political system (though not necessarily an unprecedented level of polarization, 
see Bialik 2013). Indeed, political polarization has grabbed the attention of media outlets 
across the political spectrum: Vox.com ran a headline in September 2017 warning that 
“rabid partisanship could destroy American democracy” (Drutman 2017) while the Wall 
Street Journal proclaimed that “Political Divisions in U.S. Are Widening, Long-
Lasting” (Hook 2017). Janet Hook wrote for the Wall Street Journal that, “people who 
identify with either party increasingly disagree not just on policy; they inhabit separate 
worlds of diﬀering social and cultural values and even see their economic outlook through 
County Bush Trump Republican diﬀerence
Bladen 45.63% 53.78% 8.15 pts
Camden 57.51% 70.83% 13.32 pts
Durham 35.64% 18.16% -17.48 pts
Republican diﬀerence = Trump - Bush
Republican diﬀerence Category
0-5 points gained Low gain
5.01-10 points gained Medium gain
10.01-15 points gained High gain
0-5 points lost Low loss
5.01-10 points lost Medium loss
10.01-15 points lost High loss
15+ points lost Very high loss
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a partisan lens” (Hook 2017). Pew Research Center reported that since 1994, the partisan 
gap between Democrats and Republicans nationwide has jumped from 15 points to 36 
points, a record high since the survey was first conducted (Pew Research Center 2017). 
 Investigations such as the surveys undertaken by Pew Research Center provide 
valuable data that assess the attitude of the electorate, but oﬀer only a bird’s eye view of 
American politics by privileging reported attitudes and non-spatial statistics over 
outcomes of elections and smaller-scale spatial data. By contrast, Agnew and Muscarà 
assert that, “not only is American politics increasingly polarized ideologically, […] but the 
country itself is increasingly geographically polarized politically, albeit not at the state 
level of sections or macroregions, […] but at the scale of counties, suburbs, and 
municipalities” (2012, 4). Of utmost importance in electoral-geographical studies is the 
consideration of place and scale. On the issue of place, John Agnew writes that, “the 
categorical approach [i.e. “non-spatial sorting of people”] suﬀers from a sort of ‘agnosia’ or 
disorder of perception in which representations of space only set boundaries for non-
spatial processes” (1996, 131). Such an assertion dates back to the days of Aristotle 
(Woolstencroft 1980, 540), and perfectly captures what is lost in country-wide surveys 
with no consideration for place. In order to remedy the “disorder of perception,” one must 
consider that “the hierarchical-geographical context or place channels the flow of 
interests, influence and identity out of which political activities emanate” (Agnew 1996, 
133). In other words, place matters when studying political behavior (Flint 2000), though 
it is not deterministic. To describe changing political attitudes without consideration of 
local context means sacrificing a wealth of insight provided by place-based studies that 
add nuance to any explanation or description of on-the-ground political circumstances. 
 However, applying the idea that “place matters” to electoral-geographical studies 
remains insuﬃcient. If geographers are to study the impact of local contexts, how does 
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one define ‘local’? No single 
answer exists, and diﬀerent 
studies demand attention be paid 
to various scales in order to grasp 
relevant complexities. Maps like 
the one published by Politico (see 
Map 3) reinforce the idea that 
presidential elections should be 
studied at the state-level, though 
that approach obscures the internal heterogeneity of the states’ electoral results. To 
categorize states as either ‘red’ or ‘blue’ signals to the viewer that the states are 
homogeneous containers: The electorate of Mississippi, for example, looks as if it is 
entirely comprised of right-leaning voters, whereas California appears solidly Democratic. 
 By contrast, considering voting trends below the state level shows a gradient that 
transcends state boundaries and is dominated by far more purple than clearly demarcated 
red or blue zones (Holbrook 2016). Though the extent to which the United States is 
politically polarized remains up for debate, there are material changes in the political 
landscape of North Carolina that deserve some discussion and signal a significantly 
changed American political geography. Chief among these is the evolution of landslide 
counties over time and the proliferation of what I call ‘mega-landslide counties.’  
 How we define a landslide county, of course, determines how many landslide 
counties we count. Though there is not a single definition of a landslide victory, the term 
generally refers to a situation in which one candidate or party wins an overwhelming 
majority of votes cast. Otherwise called a non-competitive county or district, a landslide 
win has traditionally been defined as an electoral victory that exceeds twenty points 
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Map 3. 2016 presidential election results by state 
(Politico 2016). 
(where one party or candidate wins 60% of the vote). Bill Bishop used twenty points as a 
threshold for determining competitive or non-competitive counties in his own work 
(2008), and FiveThirtyEight and the New York Times use a twenty-point threshold in 
their discussions of landslide electoral victories and the waning competitiveness of 
American elections (see e.g. Wasserman 2017; Aisch, Pearce, and Yourish 2016).  
 By this definition, the number of landslide counties has soared in recent years. The 
number of competitive counties in North Carolina after the 2000 presidential election 
stood firmly at forty-nine — just short of half of North Carolina’s total number of 
counties. After the 2016 presidential election, only thirty-seven counties remained 
competitive, a drop of nearly twenty-five percent. Such a trend is not limited to 
nationwide elections. Senatorial elections are showing similar patterns. During the 2002 
senatorial election in North Carolina, sixty counties had margins below twenty points. In 
2016, only forty remained. Perhaps more importantly, seventy counties became less 
competitive between 2000 and 2016 (i.e. showed an increase in margins between the 2000 
and 2016 presidential elections), mostly by significant margins.  
 Averaging the diﬀerence in margins across all North Carolina’s counties gives 
some idea of how much counties are changing over time. Some margins stayed relatively 
the same. For example, George Bush beat Al Gore in Bladen County by 8.36 points. In 
2016, Donald Trump beat Hillary Clinton in Bladen county by 9.39 points (producing a 
less competitive election by only 1.03 points) (see Table 6 for examples).  
 The average change in the electoral margin between the 2000 and 2016 
presidential elections was 6.9 points (average of all Diﬀerence values for presidential 
elections) while the senatorial elections between 2002 and 2016 showed an average shift 
of 8.7 points towards less competitive elections (average of all Diﬀerence values for 
senatorial elections). Among the counties that grew less competitive (seventy of one 
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hundred), the average shift was 12.7 points in presidential elections and 15.3 points 
between the 2002 and 2016 senatorial elections (average of all Diﬀerence values for 
counties that grew less competitive). Such high numbers suggest that shifts away from 
competitive elections are common and significant. 
Table 6. Snippet of elections table showing Republican diﬀerence calculation (see 
footnotes for explanation of processing).  
 The average change in the electoral margin between the 2000 and 2016 
presidential elections was 6.9 points (average of all Diﬀerence values for presidential 
elections) while the senatorial elections between 2002 and 2016 showed an average shift 
of 8.7 points towards less competitive elections (average of all Diﬀerence values for 
senatorial elections). Among the counties that grew less competitive (seventy of one 
hundred), the average shift was 12.7 points in presidential elections and 15.3 points 
between the 2002 and 2016 senatorial elections (average of all Diﬀerence values for 
counties that grew less competitive). Such high numbers suggest that shifts away from 
competitive elections are common and significant. 
  
County Bush Gore  Margin1 Trump Clinton Margin* Diﬀerence
Bladen 45.63% 53.99% 8.36 pts 53.78% 44.4% 9.39 pts 1.03 pts
Camden 57.51% 41.93% 15.58 pts 70.83% 25.45% 45.39 pts 29.81 pts
Durham 35.64% 63.72% 28.08 pts 18.16% 77.66% 59.5 pts 31.42 pts
Margin1 = absolute value of Bush - Gore
Margin* = absolute value of Trump - Clinton
Diﬀerence = Margin* - Margin1
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 The change in competitive counties, however, has not aﬀected Democratic 
candidates and Republican candidates equally. The shift away from competitiveness has 
largely taken place in Republican-leaning counties. In 2000, thirty-five of the forty-nine 
competitive counties leaned Republican; in 2016, twenty-four of the thirty-seven 
competitive counties leaned Republican, resulting in a drop of 31 percent in total 
Republican-leaning competitive counties. Meanwhile, Democratic-leaning competitive 
counties stayed relatively steady, with an exception in 2008, and shifted only from 
fourteen. It is worth noting that though the number of counties exhibiting partisan 
change over those years diﬀers greatly between Democratic- and Republican-leaning 
counties, the degree of the shift among each group is similar. Republican shares of the 
vote in counties that swung to favor Republicans (i.e. where the Republican diﬀerence is 
positive, see Table 7 for examples) in the 2016 presidential election moved roughly 5.9 
points on average (see the Note in the table), while the Democratic share of the vote  
Table 7. Snippet of elections table showing Republican and Democratic diﬀerences as 
well as averages calculations (see footnotes for explanation of processing).  
County Bush Gore Margin1 Trump Clinton Margin* Republican 
diﬀerence
Democratic 
diﬀerence
Bladen 45.63% 53.99% 8.36 pts 53.78% 44.4% 9.38 pts 8.15 pts -9.59 pts
Camden 57.51% 41.93% 15.58 
pts
70.83% 25.45% 45.39 
pts
13.32 pts -16.48 pts
Durham 35.64% 63.72% 28.08 
pts
18.16% 77.66% 59.5 pts -17.48 pts 13.94 pts
Margin1 = absolute value of Bush - Gore
Margin* = absolute value of Trump - Clinton
Republican diﬀerence = Trump - Bush
Democratic diﬀerence = Clinton - Gore
Note: Average Republican shift = average of Republican diﬀerences where the Republican diﬀerence values are 
positive (i.e. more Republican)
Note: Average Democratic shift = average of Democratic diﬀerences where the Democratic diﬀerence values are 
positive (i.e. more Democratic)
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among Democratic counties (i.e. where the Democratic diﬀerence is positive, see Table 7 for 
examples) shifted 5.5 points. When taken together, the individual partisan shifts suggest a 
slight advantage held by the Republican party at the state level, though one with a 
distinct geography shaping it at the county level. The scale of data collection (again) 
shapes our understandings of the political landscape. 
 Counties in North Carolina have not merely surpassed the 20-point threshold 
with greater frequency. Though the average shift is 6.9 points and the state-level partisan 
shifts suggest still a competitive state, the dataset shows great variation at the county-
level; margins in North Carolina have far exceeded the 20-point limit, soaring past 40 
points in some cases. The increase in what I call “mega-landslide” counties, or counties 
where the margin reaches beyond 40 points, demonstrates a very particular partisan 
pattern and geography. Between the 2000 and 2016 presidential elections, far more 
Republican-leaning mega-landslide counties have emerged — particularly in the western 
regions of the state and in pockets along the coast. What was relatively uncommon in 
2000 (mega-landslide counties of all partisan leanings only represented 6 percent of 
North Carolina’s counties) grew to represent 26 percent of all counties in 2016. Of those 
26 in 2016, 24 were Republican-won, demonstrating more than a 300 percent increase 
from its 2000 numbers (see Maps 4-8). As is evident in Figure 4, Republican-won 
counties have remained relatively steady while Republican-won mega-landslide counties 
have exploded. Democratic-won mega-landslide counties, on the other hand, remain flat 
— as do Democratic wins. 
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Maps 4-8. County categorization based on 2016 electoral values, 2000-2016. 

Figure 4.   
 32
Experimental partisan shift calculation 
 Most obviously, such a striking increase in landslide, and perhaps more 
pertinently, mega-landslide counties demonstrates some shift towards more homogenous 
voting communities over the relevant years for elections at the national level. The 
mechanism producing such a change is almost certainly a complex equation of policy 
preferences, voting access, quotidian variables shaping who votes and when, and migration 
within and out the state. Data doesn’t exist, however, that counts individuals, collects their 
vote preferences, and identifies whether they have moved, where, and why. Though 
qualitative measures were not possible for this study, developing some general sense of 
who is moving where and who they vote for can provide insight into the potential 
political eﬀects of the migration of diﬀerent groups.  
 In order to determine what those patterns might look like, I applied an 
experimental method using data collected by Pew Research Center documenting how 
diﬀerent groups based on their level of education tend to vote (see Figure 5) in 
conjunction with the 2007-2011 county-to-county migration dataset prepared by the U.S. 
Census Bureau, which breaks down movers by level of education. By applying the 
proportions outlined by Pew Research Center to the total number of each type of mover 
based on their level of education, it is possible to derive a rough estimate of the partisan 
profile of the movers in North Carolina.   
 What we find is a series of complex results. There is a strong negative statistical 
relationship (Pearson value = -.511, where the p-value is less than .05) between the 
counties that are predicted to move to the left between 2007 and 2011 based on the 
absolute shift via experimental calculation and the actual diﬀerence between Republican 
margins in 2000 and 2016 (i.e. the higher v experimentally calculated Democratic shift, 
the higher the Republican losses between 2000 and 2016). Additionally, the degree of the 
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calculated Democratic shift relative to the county’s registered voting population in 2011 
shows a negative statistical relationship with Republican margins, though not as strong 
(i.e. the higher the calculated shift towards the Democratic Party relative to the 
population of the county, the higher the Republican losses between 2000 and 2016) 
(Pearson value = .357, p-value is less than .05). 
 The relationship between the calculated shifts and Republican losses between 
2008 and 2012 show no significance, however (Pearson value = .046, p-value is greater 
than .05). Crucially, the Republican party’s performance across North Carolina’s counties 
between 2008 and 2012 hardly budged (the Republican change, or the diﬀerence between 
Romney’s county-level results and McCain’s county-level results, only range from -2 
points to 7 points, while 2000 to 2016 shows a range of -18 to 14 points). Indeed, while 
more substantial Republican losses were recorded from 2012 to 2016, the 2016 election 
was not entirely exceptional (the range of the Republican shifts is -10 to 6 points).  
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Figure 5. Party aﬃliation among adults in North Carolina by educational group, 2014 
(Pew Research Center 2014).
 Though the numbers produced by such an experimental approach certainly are not 
intended to and do not produce a precise picture of partisan migrants, it is useful to 
compare the results to changes on the ground. What we find is a connection worth 
investigating between expected Republican losses and actual Republican losses (of course, 
actual changes and calculated changes do not match up in every case, and in some cases, 
calculated changes suggest the opposite of on-the-ground changes). Additionally, the 
segment of the data related to educational attainment represents a mere subset of the 
entire migration data picture; because Pew Research Center includes a category for 
‘mixed’ preferences, a significant portion of the voting population is left out of the 
calculation. It is important to remember too that the number of migrants is quite small 
relative to the populations of their destination counties. The 15,159 migrants whose 
educational attainments were recorded and who settled in Wake county between 2007 
and 2011 comprise a small fraction of the population in a county where the 2011 
estimation hovered around 1 million (with a registered voting population of 600,000). The 
calculated partisan shift (that there were 1,387 more Democrats moving to Wake county 
than Republicans) would produce just over two thousandths of a point in the favor of 
Democrats in a presidential election assuming all registered voters participated. Finally, 
the calculated absolute shift proved to be a much better predictor than the shift relative to 
the counties’ registered voting population.  
 Interestingly, the calculated shift matched on-the-ground results quite well in 
cases of counties where Democrats gained ground from 2000 to 2016, but failed to do so 
for Republican counties. This could be explained by the fact that the absolute shifts are 
small relative the counties’ populations in counties with high Republican gains, leaving 
the value washed out. For example, the two highest calculated Democratic shifts was 
1,387 and 1,045, while the two highest Republican shifts were 72 and 24 (see Table 8). 
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Alternatively, the failure of the data could be a consequence of the fact that Democrats 
show a greater propensity to move to counties where they will live among more co-
partisans. In any case, the mixed results point to the weakness of this experimental 
approach, at least in the case of North Carolina.  
 At the same time, we should not totally dismiss the results. If the calculated shifts 
resemble any trend we see on the ground, there is something more to investigate. 
Moreover, we should consider such a hypothetical (that the Democratic population 
increased by 1,387 people) in the context of the previous discussion of political identity 
and the eﬀect of like-minded groups. Perhaps even small changes that result from 
migration could be swept up in a positive feedback loop that pushes new arrivals (and in 
particular, those already identifying with the general political sentiment) towards the local 
political consensus—in the process, further embedding their political identities. Equally 
as compelling is the idea that as counties grow more populous, their electoral results will 
reflect the political preferences of newcomers (assuming there is substantial political 
participation among them). If partisanship is unlikely to change dramatically (Pew 
Research Center 2017), and as populations grow, counties show a greater aﬃnity for one 
party or another, we can safely assume that more partisans sharing that political 
preference now live and vote there.  
Migration data analysis 
U.S. Census Bureau designation 
 The insights embedded in Map 9, Figure 6, and Figure 7 reveal some of the 
nuance in migration patterns in North Carolina between 2006 and 2010. The movement 
suggested by the visualizations corresponds to what is largely discussed in terms of the 
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urban-rural divide. Although the U.S. Census does not classify counties as “rural,” there is 
a distinctive diﬀerence between movement out of metropolitan counties and movement 
Table 8. Five counties showing the greatest calculated shifts towards the Republican and 
Democratic Parties by absolute shifts.
out of non-metro, non-core counties. The most obvious takeaway is that the vast majority 
of movement between counties in North Carolina between 2006 and 2010 occurred 
between metropolitan counties (61% of all movers). Additionally, metropolitan counties 
attracted the most movers out of the remaining two categories. The majority of movers 
from all groups — metropolitan; micropolitan; and non-metro, non-core counties — 
moved to metropolitan counties, representing 80%, 66%, and 51% of their respective 
groups. The same holds true from 2011 to 2015. In fact, the aggregate movement between 
the three subgroups is nearly identical; none of the types of flows (i.e. metropolitan to 
County Absolute shift Relative shift Republican diﬀerence
Wake -1,387 -0.002311 -15.97 pts
Mecklenburg -1,045 -0.001696 -18.08 pts
Buncombe -307 -0.001736 -13.83 pts
Durham -305 -0.00164 -17.48 pts
Forsyth -265 -0.00115 -13.37 pts
Lee 21 0.000641 -3.11 pts
Greene 21 0.00191 -3.09 pts
Lenoir 24 0.000634 -3.62 pts
Sampson 32 0.000871 3.12 pts
Johnston 72 0.000715 -2.83 pts
Absolute shift = calculated Republicans - calculated Democrats (where negative values refer to a calculated increase 
in Democratic voters
Relative shift = absolute shift / total registered voters in December 2011
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micropolitan; non-metro, non-core to metropolitan) experience more than a 1-point 
change.  
Map 9. County categorization based on U.S. Census Bureau designation.  
  
  
The data demonstrates two important trends between 2006 and 2015: 1) migration 
within the state of North Carolina primarily took place among and between metropolitan 
counties, and 2) metropolitan counties received the most in-migrants from the other two 
subgroups. See Table 9 for a breakdown of counties into regions.  
Table 9. County breakdown based on U.S. Census Bureau designation. 
U.S. Census Bureau designation Number of counties
Metropolitan 46
Micropolitan 28
Non-metro, non-core 26
Total 100
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Figure 6.  
Figure 7.  
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Prosperity zones 
 Refer to Map 10 and Table 10 to see the breakdown of counties and prosperity 
zones. Across the eight regions, the greatest share of migrants moved within the same 
region (those numbers are slightly lower in the Northwest, Northeast, and Sandhills 
regions) (see Figures 8 and 9). Perhaps unsurprisingly, most of the migration within 
North Carolina took place in the North Central and Southwest parts of the state — the 
homes of the Research Triangle and Charlotte, respectively. Roughly 44% of migrants in 
the state left one of those two regions, and those two regions received 45% of new arrivals. 
Piedmont, the home of Greensboro and the Winston-Salem metropolitan areas, nearly 
rivaled the Southwest, with 10,000 fewer migrants leaving Piedmont than the Southwest 
in both the 2006-10 and 2011-15 periods (roughly 1% of the total migrating community 
in North Carolina in each cycles). Two key takeaways include 1) the most mobile regions 
in North Carolina are those with substantial urban centers (Charlotte, Raleigh, and 
Greensboro are the three most populous cities in North Carolina), and 2) though most 
migrants moved within their own regions, the North Central, Southwest, and Piedmont 
regions received the second-largest number of migrants across the remaining five 
prosperity zones. 
Map 10. County categorization based on the North Carolina Department of Commerce 
Prosperity Zones. 
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Table 10. County breakdown based on North Carolina Department of Commerce 
designation. 
Figure 8.  
Prosperity zone Number of counties
North Central 15
Northeast 17
Northwest 12
Piedmont 11
Sandhills 10
Southeast 12
Southwest 10
Western 13
Total 100
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Figure 9. 
Aggregate electoral value 
 See Map 11 for the geography of the aggregate electoral value. Both the 2006-10 
and 2011-15 cycles show strikingly similar trends, which suggests that little changed in 
the nature of migration as it relates to the aggregate electoral value in North Carolina 
over the 10-year period. Based on the aggregate value, partisan leaning seems to have had 
little eﬀect on how many people migrated — migrants from ldem, mdem, and hdem 
counties accounted for roughly one half of all migrants in the North Carolina while the 
remaining half of internal migrants came from lgop, mgop, and hgop counties in both 
cycles (though Republican-leaning counties comprise 71% of all counties in North 
Carolina). Migrants from ldem counties comprised 37% of all movers, and importantly, 
the ldem category includes Mecklenburg, Wake, Guilford, and Forsyth counties, which are 
the four most populous counties in the state (U.S. Census Bureau 2011). Additionally, 
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hdem and hgop counties produce little movement, comprising only 6% and 4% respectively 
of all out-migrants in the state.   
Map 11. County categorization based on aggregate electoral values.  
  
Separating counties based on aggregate electoral values neutralizes the eﬀect of 
temporal shifts and focuses on median values over a given period. As a result, the trends 
we find reveal little about the relationship between an evolving political landscape and 
interstate migration in North Carolina. With that in mind, I opted not to create sankey 
diagrams and future work should avoid aggregate metrics that do not acknowledge the 
extent of change over time. See Table 11 for the county breakdown.  
Table 11. County breakdown based on aggregate electoral value.  
Aggregate electoral category Number of counties
hgop 8
mgop 32
lgop 31
ldem 19
mdem 8
hdem 2
Total 100
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2016 Presidential electoral value 
 The 2016 Presidential election produced a substantial number of Republican-won 
landslide counties (mgop in Table 6) — 28 counties in total (see Map 12 and Table 12). 
The migration in and out of those counties reflects the high share of the category, 
comprising 23% of all of in-migrants in the state. More interesting is the fact that ldem 
and mdem categories follow despite only holding 13 and 9 counties respectively. Table 6 
oﬀers a complete view of the distribution of counties within the categories compared to 
the relative populations of each category. Indeed, though Democratic mega-landslide 
counties (or those with margins that exceed 40 points) are few in number, they contain far 
more people than Republican-won mega-landslide counties, which are substantially more 
sparsely populated.  
Map 12. County categorization based on 2016 presidential election result.  
 Interestingly, migration among Democratic-won and Republican-won counties is 
nearly equal, with Republican counties carrying a slight advantage. The representation of 
each category is broadly reflective of the distribution of population each category holds 
(see Figures 10 and 11 for comparison). For example, mgop has the largest share of North 
Carolina’s population (25.28%), and 24% of migrants from 2006 to 2015 left mgop 
counties. Among counties with high margins, there is little exchange (i.e. very few people 
left hgop counties to move to hdem counties, and very few left hdem counties to live in hgop 
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counties). Though this metric is more helpful than the aggregate value (as it does not 
incorporate and wash out temporal diﬀerences), it still fails to contend with the electoral 
change that has taken place over time at the county level in North Carolina. Identifying 
the evolution and integrating it meaningfully into the measure is an important element of 
studying migration and electoral change in North Carolina over space and time.  
Table 12. County breakdown based on 2016 electoral value.  
Republican change electoral value 
 Central to the Republican change metric is the idea of incorporating temporal 
shifts in partisan support across the counties of North Carolina. It’s important to 
highlight, however, that some counties showing a Republican loss over the test period still 
voted for Donald Trump in 2016, and some counties where Republicans made gains 
voted for Hillary Clinton. Above all, the variable is intended to use change over time 
(rather than the most recent results) as the center point for the migration data. 
Additionally, in the discussion of the results, I use ‘Democratic-leaning’ as a shorthand for 
losses experienced by the Republican party. Though that is not universally the case, the 
rigidity of the two-party system and electoral stagnation of third-party candidates 
functionally means that a loss for one major party is a victory for the other.  
Presidential electoral category Number of counties
hgop 24
mgop 28
lgop 24
ldem 2
mdem 9
hdem 13
Total 100
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Figure 10.  
Figure 11. 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 When we consider how partisan preferences have changed (based on presidential 
election results in 2000 and 2016), particular relationships between Democratic shifts and 
migration stand out: two-thirds of those moving in North Carolina are leaving counties 
that have shifted to favor Democratic candidates more since 2000 and  2016, and roughly 
two-thirds of those movers choose other counties that have shifted to favor Democratic 
candidates (see Map 13). Notably, 
those same Democratic-leaning 
counties comprise just  
over a third of all of the state’s 
counties (36 out of 100), meaning 
that they are punching above their 
weight in terms of the number of 
migrants they attract (see Figure 12). 
Additionally, as the shift towards the 
Republican party increases, the 
probability that a migrant chooses 
another county that moved to favor 
the Republican party increases as 
well (e.g. a higher proportion of 
migrants that left medium gain 
counties moved to other counties 
with a Republican shift than those 
migrants who left low gain counties). 
Despite that trend, movement to 
counties that have shifted to favor 
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Figure 12. 
Democratic candidates (even from Republican-leaning counties) greatly outnumbered 
movement to counties that shifted to the right from 2000 to 2016 (see Figures 13 and 
14).  
Map 13. County categorization based on Republican shift value. 
  
 Strikingly, the distribution of population among the groups varies greatly. Though 
the very high loss category only contains three counties (not coincidentally Mecklenburg, 
Wake, and Durham counties), 19% of all migrants leave those counties and it receives 
19% of all migrants as well. Those three account for the most significant labor markets in 
the state. See Table 13 for the county breakdown.  
Summary of migration trends in North Carolina from 2006-2015 
1. Most migration in North Carolina takes place between and among metropolitan 
counties (although it remains unclear whether one metropolitan experiences net 
worker displacement, per Moretti and Wilson 2014) — a person who is moving is 
most likely to move to a metropolitan county, regardless of where they’re moving 
from. 
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2. Most migration in North Carolina takes place between and among metropolitan 
counties (although it remains unclear whether one metropolitan experiences net 
worker displacement, per Moretti and Wilson 2014) — a person who is moving is 
most likely to move to a metropolitan county, regardless of where they’re moving 
from. 
3. People tend to move within their own regions. If they don’t stay in their own region, 
they’re likely to move to the regions that are home to Mecklenburg (Charlotte), 
Raleigh (Raleigh), or Guilford counties (Greensboro). 
4. The most mobile populations in North Carolina live in counties that have moved to 
the left politically between 2000 and 2016. Furthermore, as the degree of Republican 
gains increase, the more likely it is that movers from those counties migrated to 
another Republican-leaning county. 
Table 13. County breakdown based on the GOP change value.
Republican party change 
category
Number of counties Share of total population
High gain 11 3.11%
Medium gain 24 12.87%
Low gain 29 14.69%
Low loss 18 17.72%
Medium loss 9 13.92%
High loss 6 14.19%
Very high loss 3 23.5%
Total 100 100%
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Figure 13.  
Figure 14. 
 50
Educational attainment 
 With an idea of the nature of movement in North Carolina, we can dive into the 
role of educational attainment plays in pattens of migration. The most powerful way to 
study the role of educational attainment is to compare the migration patterns of diﬀerent 
groups, consider the way such groups tend to vote (based on aggregate data), and to 
explore how such patterns might push elections in one direction or another. See Tables 
14-18 for a review of the migration data grouped by educational attainment. 
Table 14. Advanced degree holders by GOP change category.   
Table 15. Bachelor degree holders by GOP change category.  
Republican party change category Migrants by origin county Share of total
High gain 177 1.61%
Medium gain 450 4.09%
Low gain 1,141 10.38%
Low loss 1,505 13.69%
Medium loss 1,432 13.02%
High loss 2,335 21.24%
Very high loss 3,955 35.97%
Total 10,995 100%
Republican party change category Migrants by origin county Share of total
High gain 291 1.16%
Medium gain 1,915 7.60%
Low gain 2,694 10.69%
Low loss 3,398 13.49%
Medium loss 3,601 14.29%
High loss 5,266 20.90%
Very high loss 8,027 31.86%
Total 25,192 100%
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Table 16. Migrants with some college by GOP change category.  
Table 17. High school graduates by GOP change category.  
Advanced degree holders 
 Approximately three-quarters of the 10,000+ advanced-degree holders left 
counties that shifted away from the Republican party between 2000 and 2016, and the 
majority of those remained in counties that did the same. Given that the loss counties only 
comprise roughly a third of North Carolina’s counties, those counties that moved away 
from the Republican party are significantly overrepresented in terms of their mobile 
Republican party change 
category
Migrants by origin county Share of total
High gain 780 1.78%
Medium gain 5,189 11.86%
Low gain 7,559 17.28%
Low loss 8,073 18.45%
Medium loss 6,662 15.23%
High loss 6,441 14.72%
Very high loss 9,047 20.68%
Total 43,751 100%
Republican party change 
category
Migrants by origin county Share of total
High gain 912 2.53%
Medium gain 5,306 14.70%
Low gain 7,442 20.62%
Low loss 6,220 17.23%
Medium loss 4,614 12.78%
High loss 5,142 14.25%
Very high loss 6,460 17.90%
Total 36,096 100%
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Table 18. Migrants without a high school degree by GOP change category.  
advanced-degree holders. More than a third of the movers left very high loss counties (i.e. 
those that experienced a shift of 15 points or more to favor Democrats between 2000 and 
2016) — remembering that only 3 counties fall in that category: Wake, Durham, and 
Mecklenburg.  Within that group of advanced degree-holders who left counties in the 
very high loss category, a third of those remained in a very high loss county. Moreover, they 
receive roughly a third of all internal migrants with an advanced degree. It likely will not 
come as a surprise to note that those three counties are the homes of North Carolina’s 
economic regions with the deepest ties to an information- and knowledge-driven 
economy: Raleigh and Charlotte.  
 However, as the Republican gain increases, the number of mobile advanced-
degree holders decreases. Only about 15% of advanced-degree holders moved from a 
county that leaned more the right in 2016 than in 2000 (1,768 movers). Counties that 
shifted significantly to favor the Republican party from 2000 to 2016 (i.e. high gain 
counties) lost more advanced degree holders than they gained, although they were few to 
begin with relative to other categories. In fact, nearly no advanced-degree holders moved 
Republican party change 
category
Migrants by origin county Share of total
High gain 735 3.07%
Medium gain 4,117 17.17%
Low gain 4,382 18.28%
Low loss 3,542 14.77%
Medium loss 3,583 14.95%
High loss 3,328 13.88%
Very high loss 4,286 17.88%
Total 23,973 100%
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to a high-gain county. Although Republican-leaning counties tend to have lower 
populations, population does not entirely explain the diﬀerence between Republican-
leaning and Democratic-leaning counties (see Table 19 for comparison of share of mobile 
advanced-degree holders and population). 
Table 19. Representation of advanced degree holders among GOP shift categories. 
 The majority of mobile, advanced-degree holding movers already live in areas 
leaning to the left politically, and are very likely to move to a place where a similar 
political environment prevails (see Figure 15). Advanced-degree holders are the group 
most likely to lean heavily to the left politically, which arguably makes their apparent 
preference for Democratic-leaning counties predictable. Naturally, the motivating factor 
behind choosing a new home does not have to be explicitly political. However, that an 
overwhelming majority of the group demonstrates a tendency to live in areas that have 
moved away from conservative politics cannot be ignored. It is possible for identities, such 
as partisanship, education, and economic opportunity, to converge to produce such 
patterns (Enos 69), and the data suggest that we make room for partisanship in that 
equation. 
Republican party 
change category
Share of mobile advanced-
degree holders (ADH)
Share of total population / 
ratio of ADH to population
Rank by 
population
High gain 1.61% 3.11% / .518 7
Medium gain 4.09% 12.87% / .318 6
Low gain 10.38% 14.69% / .707 3
Low loss 13.69% 17.72% / .773 2
Medium loss 13.02% 13.92% / .935 5
High loss 21.23% 14.19% / 1.496 4
Very high loss 35.97% 23.5% / 1.531 1
Total 100% 100%
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Figure 15.  
College graduates 
 The pattern of movement among those with a college degree is strikingly similar 
to that of migrants with advanced degrees (see Table 20), although it favors loss counties 
slightly less. Across the board, mobile migrants with a bachelor’s degree are much more 
likely to move to a Democratic-leaning county than a Republican-leaning one, regardless 
of their origin county category. A little over 80% of all internal migrants left counties 
where Republicans performed worse in 2016 than in 2000, which suggests that counties 
that have leaned towards Democrats in recent years are also home to the most mobile 
populations. The likelihood that a migrant lands in a Democratic-leaning county increases 
with the degree of the loss experienced by Republicans from 2000 to 2016 (i.e. a migrant 
leaving a very high loss county is more likely than a migrant leaving a low loss county to 
move to a Democratic-leaning county). Close to a third of internal migrants with college 
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degrees left one of those same three counties that figure so prominently for advanced 
degree holders (Wake, Mecklenburg, and Durham counties), and roughly a third of those 
remained in one of those three counties (30%). An overwhelming majority (close to 87%) 
of migrants that left very high loss counties moved to another county where Republicans 
lost ground (see Figure 16). 
 Like the trend exhibited by advanced degree holders, mobile college graduates are 
overrepresented in counties where Republicans performed less well from 2000 to 2016, 
though the pattern is not correlated with diﬀerences in population. Just over 1% of mobile 
college graduates live in counties where Republicans have made significant gains in recent 
years, and although those migrants had a higher chance of moving to another 
Republican-leaning county than other groups, still close to 60% of them moved to a 
county that shifted away from the Republican party; over a quarter stayed in high gain 
counties, the highest of all individual categories. 
Table 20. Representation of college graduates among GOP shift categories. 
Republican 
party change 
category
Share of mobile college 
graduates (CG)
Share of total population 
/ ratio of CG to 
population
Rank by 
population
High gain 1.16% 3.11% / .373 7
Medium gain 7.60% 12.87% / .591 6
Low gain 10.69% 14.69% / .728 3
Low loss 13.49% 17.72% / .761 2
Medium loss 14.29% 13.92% / 1.027 5
High loss 20.90% 14.19% / 1.473 4
Very high loss 31.86% 23.5% / 1.356 1
Total 100% 100%
Note: Share of total population refers to the share of North Carolina’s residents that live in a county category
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Figure 16. 
  
Migrants with some college 
 Migrants with college degrees or higher display a particular type of movement 
within the state: the pattern suggests that most mobile people in the state already live in a 
county that leaned away from Republicans from 2000 to 2016 and similarly display a 
strong preference for counties that show less and less support for the Republican party 
(indeed, the proportion of migrants with a college degree or higher than left a gain county 
to move to a loss county is quite small, which suggests that most highly educated, mobile 
migrants already live in counties where Republicans have lost ground). The pattern among 
those without a college degree, however, shows substantial change (see Figure 17).  
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Figure 17. 
  
Migrants without a college degree 
 Among the segment of migrants without a college or advanced degree, we see a 
significant drop in the number of people with some college leaving very high loss counties 
as well as a decrease in the proportion of migrants leaving loss counties and moving to loss 
counties (see Figures 18 and 19). In fact, as educational attainment decreases among 
internal migrants, it is increasingly likely that a migrant moves between two counties that 
both favored the Republican party in recent years (5.30% and 4.15% of migrants with an 
advanced degree and a college degree respectively fall into this category; 10.05%, 14.02%, 
16.86% of migrants with some college, a high school degree, and less than a high school 
degree respectively moved between two counties where Republican support has 
increased). Additionally, and perhaps unsurprisingly, as educational attainment decreases, 
there is a greater chance that a migrant is moving between two counties with opposite 
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electoral trends; in other words, a migrant with a high school degree is much more likely 
to move from a county that has leaned more toward the Republican party to a county 
where Republican support has faltered or vice versa than a migrant with a college or 
advanced degree (the diﬀerence is stark: 45.56% of migrants with a high school degree 
moved between counties with divergent electoral patterns, while only 25.77% of those 
with an advanced degree fall into that category).  
 It is worth noting that among migrants without a college degree, anywhere from 
37% to 47% will still move between counties where Republicans lost ground between 
2000 and 2016. This is likely a function of the facts that a) those counties have a 
disproportionately large share of the state’s population, and b) greater economic 
opportunities are is available in counties that are more densely populated (and also tend 
to be more Democratic).  
Figure 18.  
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Figure 19.  
Key takeaways 
1. Migrants with bachelor’s degrees or higher are much more likely than other 
education groups to live in and move to a county where Republican performance 
suﬀered greatly over the last five presidential elections.  
2. Migrants with bachelor’s degrees or higher are overrepresented in the mobile 
population between loss counties.  
3. Patterns of migration among groups with less education more closely reflect the 
distribution of population among the respective counties.  
  
 The data demonstrates undeniably that at a minimum, education and migration 
are not independent of each other, though the nature of the relationship between them 
cannot be defined conclusively. Above the specifics of the dataset, the existence of such a 
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relationship is, from my perspective, a key takeaway. That education shapes both political 
preferences in addition to patterns of migration as we have seen sends the important 
message that we should be considering elections and migration in tandem. Studies of 
migration must situate the patterns around variables like education (among other 
demographic variables) if we are to take seriously the potential impact of voter migration. 
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IV. CONCLUSION  
 The Economic Innovation Group published findings from its Distressed 
Communities Index, reporting that, “the falling total number of Americans in distressed 
zip codes reflects a shift in the geography of economic distress towards rural areas” (2018). 
Eduardo Porter opens his piece titled “The Hard Truths of Trying to Save the Rural 
Economy” writing that, “there are 60 million people, almost one in five Americans, living 
on farms, in hamlets and in small towns across the landscape. For the last quarter century 
the story of these places has been one of relentless economic decline” (2018). The title 
alone betrays the economic bias that feature prominently in most discussions of 
contemporary rural America.  Porter highlights the power of urban cluster economies and 
the geography of opportunity in the United States, and even points to the election of 
Donald Trump as an explanation for increased attention to the issue. Like most popular 
writing on changes in rural America, however, the piece fails to make the important step 
of considering the political consequences of this new economic geography (and critically, 
the migration that results from it) in the United States. Such an omission is a crucial one 
if we are to contend with the increasingly homogenous political communities in the 
United States.  
 The central challenge to identifying, quantifying, or characterizing this 
relationship is the lack of data (as reported by other scholars, see e.g. Jurjevich and Plane 
2012, Holbrook 2016, Hui 2013). To deal with this, two paths forward seem the most 
promising. One is to embrace more fully a data-driven approach, like the experimental 
method implemented by Jurjevich and Plane. They created a complex equation for 
guessing partisan aﬃliation of migrants based on a series of demographic characteristics 
and drew conclusions about the electoral impact of migration in the United States. 
Though this runs the risk of rendering a verdict based on bad or inappropriately analyzed 
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data, it allows for an extensive approach unhindered by the limitations of a small-scale 
study. Additionally, this body of work would benefit greatly from further ground-truthing 
and studies like those run by Hui (2013) and Gimpel and Hui (2015). Interviewing 
migrants about how they made choices regarding their resettlement could oﬀer more 
insight into the process of voter sorting. Finally, should these two research paths yield 
more evidence of voter sorting, scholars can make the case for a large-scale data-driven 
study of migrants that includes their partisan leaning or aﬃliation in addition to the 
details of their move (i.e. origin county, destination county, origin census block, 
destination census block). Only then can researchers draw more concrete conclusions 
about the impact of voter sorting. As it stands, we are left with studies that hint at what is 
possible (and indeed, probable given the significant impact of the changed American 
economic geography), but without the details that would empower us to address the 
consequences more fully.  
 Of central importance to American electoral structures is the spatial distribution 
of voters, a reality that came sharply into focus after Donald Trump’s 2016 popular loss 
and electoral win. As urban centers continue to attract high-skill, highly educated people, 
the question of the electoral impact of migration in the United States will only become 
more important. This body of research would benefit greatly from more involvement from 
geographers, and should push us to think more critically about how the spatial structure 
of American elections produces certain results across space. Perhaps most importantly, it 
is imperative that we begin to consider the political consequences of the oft-discussed 
“brain drain.” It is hard to overstate the importance that such a trend could play in 
reshaping the political landscape in the United States; as Gimpel and Hui note, “Even if a 
small fraction of partisans make choices on a political basis, the cumulative eﬀect in the 
long run can greatly augment population diﬀerences across space” (2015).  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APPENDIX A. HOW TO READ A SANKEY DIAGRAM 
How to read a sankey diagram 
  
 Sankey diagrams are visualizations that show flows and proportions, where the 
width of the lines in the diagram correspond to the proportion of a value relative to the 
whole. Throughout this paper, I have used sankey diagrams to demonstrate migration 
within the state of North Carolina. As mentioned earlier, however, it is impractical and 
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not very useful to show movement between each of North Carolina’s 100 counties. 
Instead, I have divided the counties into diﬀerent categories based on several criteria, and 
then used those categories to show movement within the state with the added context the 
category provides. As an example, consider the diagram below, where North Carolina’s 
counties are divided based on their designations made by the U.S. Census Bureau as 
either metropolitan; micropolitan; or non-metro, non-core counties. 
 The categories at the top of the chart (the ‘origin’ county) indicate where movers 
leave and in what proportions. What we notice is that the vast majority of people moving 
in North Carolina are leaving metropolitan counties, whereas a much smaller group is 
leaving non-metro, non-core counties. The bottom line (the ‘destination’ county) tells us 
where these movers are electing to settle — in metropolitan; micropolitan; or non-metro, 
non-core counties. By using sankey diagrams, we can see general patterns of movement 
based on the described criteria. For example, we notice that though the majority of people 
leaving metropolitan counties are moving to another metropolitan county, some move to 
micropolitan counties, and an even smaller amount leave metropolitan counties to settle 
in non-metro, non-core counties. The key for making sense of the sankey diagrams here is 
to establish clearly the rules of a categorization and then to consider the ‘origin’ and 
‘destination’ sides of the visualization to get an idea of the nature of inter-county 
migration in North Carolina.  
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APPENDIX B. MIGRATION AND INCOME 
Migration and income 
 Though migration and education dominates the data analysis, I also sorted 
migrants by income, which adds another dimension to the research. See the three 
following sankey diagrams for an idea of how income shaped migration in North 
Carolina between 2007 and 2015. 
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